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Measuring Beliefs Supportive of Environmental Action and Inaction: 
A Reinterpretation of the Awareness of Consequences Scale1 
by 
Anthony M. Ryan2 and Clive L. Spash3 
ABSTRACT4 
The Value-Belief-Norm model assumes that egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric value 
orientations causally influence how people cognitively structure beliefs regarding adverse 
environmental consequences.  Empirical studies have administered the Awareness of 
Consequences (AC) scale to differentiate between these three orientations.  We report an 
analysis which challenges previous work in the field.  Evidence is presented that indicates the 
AC scale should be reinterpreted as a measure of beliefs supporting environmental action and 
beliefs supporting environmental inaction.  The beliefs supporting environmental action 
appear to be differentiable according to beliefs in the positive consequences from 
environmental protection and the seriousness of environment harm.  This has major 
implications for the Value-Belief-Norm model and its application. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution of air, water and soil, and resource shortages are 
some of the environmental challenges of the 21st Century.  Tackling ecological problems 
implies modifying a range of human behaviours conducted by the whole spectrum of societal 
actors from the individual citizen to corporations and governments.  A variety of motives 
may stimulate or prevent action.  Theoretical models can help identify key drivers and 
obstacles to achieving behavioural change.  Policy relevant behavioural models provide a 
descriptive account of the interactions between variables and are subject to empirical testing.  
Developing such models has been the aim of social psychologists working on environmental 
problems.  Psychometric scales are then typically employed to measure attitudes and beliefs, 
which are sometimes connected to foundational values.  Such attitudes and beliefs are 
regarded as key explanatory variables for human behaviour. 
Since Heberlein (1981) noted the need for understanding how people cognitively 
organise beliefs and feelings about environmental issues there has been a growth in 
environmental attitude-behaviour research resulting in a range of models (Ajzen, 1991; Grob, 
1995; Homburg & Stolberg, 2006; Ohtomo & Hirose, 2007).  However, developing 
environmental scales is difficult because environmental issues are inherently complex, 
involve multiple perspectives and plural values (Spash, 2000a).  Recent studies (Hawcroft & 
Milfont, 2010; Milfont & Duckitt, 2004) have challenged the interpretation of two widely 
employed scales, the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; 
Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000) and the Ecocentric and Anthropocentric 
Environmental Attitude scale (Thompson & Barton, 1994), alongside several less popular 
scales.  
The current study critically investigates environmental scales arising from the Value-
Belief-Norm (VBN) model of Stern and colleagues (Stern, 2000; Stern, Dietz, Abel, 
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Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999).  Stern, Dietz and Kalof (1993) integrated assumptions made by 
several other theories into a broader behavioural framework of environmental intentions 
which developed into the VBN.  This has become one of the most popular and prominent 
behavioural models in environmental psychology (De Groot & Steg, 2007, 2008; Kaiser, 
Hübner, & Bogner, 2005; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003; Oreg & Katz-Gerro, 2006; Steg & De 
Groot, 2008; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005). 
The VBN model proposes that value orientations influence various environmental 
perceptions and behaviour.  It outlines three value orientations related to the ego, social-
altruism and the biosphere (Stern, Dietz, & Guagnano, 1995a), which are expected to be 
distinguishable although correlated (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993).  The value orientations are 
hypothesised to directly influence the way in which people formulate and structure 
environmental beliefs (Stern, 2000).  Psychological scales have been developed to measure 
the models' proposed environmental beliefs.  These scales have then been administered in 
studies that examine various environmental behaviours, such as political action and 
willingness to pay for environmental improvements.  There have also been attempts to use 
the value orientation based belief scales to interpret contingent valuation on the basis of 
whether people are egoistically, altruistically or biospherically motivated (see review in 
Spash 2000b and Spash 2006).  
However, studies attempting to demonstrate that people cognitively differentiate 
between beliefs about egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric consequences, have given 
mixed empirical results.  Two approaches have been employed: the Environmental Concern 
(EC) scale and the AC scale.  Table 1 displays examples of EC and AC questions as used to 
create the scales.  Applications using the EC scale have provided supporting evidence that 
people do cognitively construct their environmental concerns consistent with the three VBN 
value orientations (Hansla, Gamble, Juliusson, & Gärling, 2008; Milfont, Duckitt, & 
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Cameron, 2006; Schultz, 2000, 2001; Schultz, Shriver, Tabanico, & Khazian, 2004; Snelgar, 
2006), while those employing the AC scale have reported poor subscale reliabilities, 
theoretically inconsistent subscale correlations and poor dimensionality (Gärling, Fujii, 
Gärling, & Jakobsson, 2003; Hansla et al., 2008; Joireman, Lasane, Bennett, Richards, & 
Solaimani, 2001; Stern et al., 1993; Stern, Dietz, Kalof, & Guagnano, 1995b).  Whether the 
AC scale is a good measure of the three underlying value orientations has been questioned 
(Snelgar, 2006; Spash, 2006).  Even Stern and colleagues (Stern et al., 1995a; Stern et al., 
1995b) have concluded that the AC scale measures only a single General Awareness of 
Consequences (GAC) construct.  However, no study has yet investigated the possibility that 
the AC scale may be measuring an alternative cognitive process for explaining behaviour. 
 
Table 1.  Example of EC and AC scale items 
Items Awareness of Consequence Scale Environmental Concern Scale 
Egoistic Environmental protection will 
provide a better world for me and 
my children. 
Protecting the environment will 
threaten jobs for people like me. 
I am concerned about 
environmental problems 
because of the consequences 
for 
- My lifestyle 
- My health 
Social/Altruistic Environmental protection will help 
people have a better quality of life. 
The effects of pollution on public 
health are worse than we realise. 
I am concerned about 
environmental problems 
because of the consequences 
for  
- All people 
- People in the community 
Biospheric Over the next several decades 
thousands of species will  become 
extinct. 
Claims that current levels of 
pollution are changing earth’s 
climate are exaggerated. 
I am concerned about 
environmental problems 
because of the consequences 
for 
- Birds 
- Plants 
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This paper aims to do so by reanalysing previously reported data.  Across two studies, 
three samples (N=572, 511, 531) were collected in face-to-face interviews with members of 
the general public in the United Kingdom (UK) as part of on-going work relating to 
economic valuation of the environment using contingent valuation (Spash, 2000c, 2006; 
Spash et al., 2009).  Previously published results from the first study, see Spash (2006), were 
interpreted as consistent with a separation between selfish-altruism (the concept of altruism 
found in mainstream economics), where gain to others is of direct benefit to the individual, 
and social-altruism, where benefiting others is an end in itself.  The AC social-altruistic scale 
can then be seen as a mixture of items from these two categories.  The evidence supported the 
idea of selfish-altruism being related to egoism while social-altruism was associated with 
biospherism, i.e. a two factor solution.  This paper reanalyses data from the first Spash (2006) 
study and analyses new data from a second study.  The results reported here indicate that AC 
scale factors are not oriented towards the self, others or the biosphere.  It is also proposed that 
the AC scale does not simply measure a one factor solution and therefore interpreting the 
content and meaning of the scale requires reconceptualising the model. 
The next section describes the VBN model along with the role of the AC scale as 
developed in the literature.  Specific items behind the scale are discussed and issues arising 
from published empirical work are reported.  Section 3 explores an alternative approach to 
understanding the results.  Section 4 describes our data and methods, and section 5 the results 
which are discussed in section 6. 
 
AWARENESS OF CONSEQUENCES THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 
Stern et al.’s (1993) social psychological theory is based on assumptions originating in 
Schwartz’s (1977) Norm Activation Model.  The latter describes altruistic behaviour as the 
result of an individual being explicitly aware of consequences in terms of the social harm of 
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not performing a particular behaviour and that they accept responsibility for the performance 
of that behaviour.  Awareness of consequences combined with accepting responsibility 
increases the probability that a person will feel morally obliged to act.  The VBN model 
changes Schwartz’s definition in two ways.  First, the “awareness of harmful consequences” 
construct, which originally described an explicit awareness of consequences, is extended to 
include beliefs about potential future world states.  For example, an individual may believe 
that “thousands of species will die within the next decade”, which may or may not happen.  
Second, an individual’s awareness of adverse consequences is assumed to be organised 
around the three value orientations pertaining to oneself, other humans and non-humans.  A 
diagrammatic depiction of the VBN model is presented in Figure 1. 
 
                   Pro-environmental 
Values                                                        Beliefs                                   Personal Norms      Behaviours 
                     
Biospheric     Ecological    Adverse     Perceived          Sense of  Activism 
      Worldview    consequences       ability to    obligation to 
Altruistic       for valued             reduce  take pro- Nonactivist 
       objects (AC)         threat (AR) environmental public-sphere 
Egoistic        actions   behaviours 
 
          Private-sphere 
          behaviours 
 
          Behaviours in  
          organisations 
 
Figure 1. The VBN model (adapted from Stern, 2000) 
 
Stern et al. (1993) describe the three value orientations as logically distinct 
relationships concerning self interest, altruism towards other humans, and altruism towards 
other species and the biosphere.  The value orientations are defined as being guiding 
principles regarding states or outcomes that are desirable or appropriate (Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz, 1992; Stern et al., 1999).  The VBN theory posits that an individual’s value 
orientation causally influences their beliefs relating to adverse consequences, because factual 
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information congruent with an individual’s value orientation is given more weight than value-
incongruent information (Stern, 2000; Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern et al., 1999).  That is: “A 
strong value orientation may lead someone to seek information selectively or to attend 
selectively to information about the consequences of an environmental condition for 
particular valued objects, and therefore to develop beliefs about those consequences that will 
guide action” (Stern & Dietz, 1994, p.68).  Thus, an individual is assumed to be more 
receptive to certain information depending upon their value orientation which then causally 
influences their beliefs.  At the same time, Stern et al. (1995a) note that beliefs can be judged 
according to criteria of truthfulness, because “beliefs…are in principle vulnerable to 
empirical challenge” (p.727-8).  This second possibility, however, has not been formally 
included in the VBN model. 
In defining attitudes, the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) also refers to the 
concept of beliefs.  Attitudes are described as comprising an assessment of outcome 
desirability and of the subjective probability that a behaviour will produce a certain outcome.  
Ajzen (1991) refers to the pragmatic subjective probability component of an attitude as being 
a belief.  In contrast, the VBN lacks a formal process by which factual information can 
influence beliefs regarding adverse environmental consequences.  The theorised VBN link 
between value orientations and beliefs may be weakened by believable freely available 
information which proves incompatible with an individual’s value orientation.  For example, 
the mass media may convince an individual that many species may die in the near future, 
even if that person has a weak biospheric value orientation. 
The EC construct can be distinguished from beliefs about adverse environmental 
consequences.  EC has been defined as being rooted in feelings of interconnectedness and 
empathy with regards to others or the natural environment (Schultz, 2000, 2001).  Value 
orientations may bias information processing via an affective or emotive process that 
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ultimately influences what an individual is concerned about rather than what they factually 
believe.  Under such circumstances, the EC construct would be expected to have a closer 
relationship with egoistic, altruistic and biospheric orientations than beliefs concerning 
factual statements about the environment. 
Whether people cognitively differentiate their environmental concerns and beliefs 
based upon Stern et al.’s proposed value orientations is a hypothesis open to empirical 
investigation.  The EC scale constructed by Schultz (2000) has produced the most supportive 
results.  As displayed in Table 1, the EC scale employs the statement: I am concerned about 
environmental problems because of consequences for ‘______’.  Respondents are then asked 
to rate nouns such as: me, my health, people in the community, future generations, plants, 
trees, whales.  EC studies have reported exploratory and confirmatory analyses that support 
the hypothesised factor structure, as well as strong subscale reliabilities and reasonably 
interpretable correlations between subscales (Hansla et al., 2008; Milfont et al., 2006; 
Schultz, 2000, 2001; Schultz et al., 2004; Snelgar, 2006).  Such results provide evidence that 
people do differentiate adverse environmental concerns according to the proposed value 
orientations. 
The items in the AC scale seem to have been designed based on a factual cause and 
consequence formula.  Each item is a statement proposing that a cause (e.g., pollution, 
environmental protection) will affect a target, i.e., either oneself (ACego), others (ACsoc), or 
the biosphere (ACbio).  For example, a biospheric item might be related to the problem of 
tropical deforestation, with the consequences being for the Earth as a whole, producing an 
item statement: “Tropical rain forests are essential to maintaining a healthy planet Earth”.  
The wording of items is generally kept simple and there appears a desire for some variety of 
positively and negatively phrased questions on each AC category to construct the overall 
scale.  Yet, within this structure alternative interpretations of an item seem possible and the 
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task facing a respondent can involve unforseen complexities.  Respondents may then interpret 
the AC items and cluster them based on alternative and unexpected criteria. 
Closed-ended questionnaire items must present participants with a restricted 
representation of an issue.  Wording and framing of items are well known influences on how 
people interpret the meaning of a questionnaire (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Wang, Simons, 
& Bredart, 2001).  Linguistic and cognitive scientists (Croft & Cruse, 2004; Lakoff, 1987; 
Pinker, 1998, 2007) have also noted that some variations of a statement or sentence will 
result in a listener or reader extracting precisely the same meaning, while others, with 
seemingly subtle sentence variations, can result in the recipient forming radically different 
interpretations.  Similarly, item sequence, the response scale and the overall questionnaire 
format can influence responses (Schwarz, 1999, 2007a, 2007b; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; 
Schwarz & Strack, 1991).  Hence, constructing an instrument that successfully differentiates 
between VBN value orientations requires more than simply designing a set of items which 
mention consequences affecting egoistic, social or biospheric targets.  In particular, an 
individual may fail to cognitively construct an interpretation based on their value orientations 
if confronted by items appearing to be factual statements. 
Table 2 displays subscale reliabilities reported by a variety of published studies 
(Gärling et al., 2003; Hansla et al., 2008; Joireman et al., 2001; Snelgar, 2006; Stern et al., 
1993; Stern et al., 1995b).  These show weak to moderate results.  Early on Stern et al. (1993) 
reasoned that moderate reliabilities might be due to too few items being administered.  
However, both Gärling et al. (2003) and Hansla et al. (2008) had to remove an item from 
each scale in order to improve reliability, while Joireman et al. (2001) reported only moderate 
reliabilities despite having 4 to 5 item scales.  Most studies conclude that a better set of items 
would improve reliability, and that quest is undoubtedly in turn responsible for the variety 
found in published versions of the scale. 
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Table 2  Published reliability statistics for AC subscales 
 Awareness of Consequences Scales 
 ACego ACsoc ACbio 
Cronbach’s Alpha    
Hansla et al. (2008) .64 
(2 items) 
.56 
(2 items) 
.56 
(3 items) 
Snelgar (2006) .30 
(4 items) 
.56 
(5 items) 
.46 
(4 items) 
Gärling et al. (2003) .45 
(2 items) 
.42 
(2 items) 
.54 
(2 items) 
Joireman et al. (2001) .67 
(4 items) 
.76 
(5 items) 
.65 
(4 items) 
Theta Reliability    
Stern et al. (1993) .66 
(3 items) 
.62 
(3 items) 
.56 
(3 items) 
Stern, Dietz, Kalof et al. (1995) .77 
(2 items) 
.71 
(2 items) 
.73 
(4 items) 
 
Several versions (i.e. using different items) of the AC scale have reported an 
assortment of measurement problems, including confusing correlation patterns with other 
scales, which suggest that the questionnaire might have low construct validity.  Schwartz’s 
(1992) self-enhancement scale has been proposed as a measure of egoistic value orientation, 
while the self-transcendence scale has been proposed as a measure of social-altruistic and 
biospheric value orientations combined as one factor.  Schwartz’s self-transcendence and 
self-enhancement scales have been found to correlate negatively, which suggests that ACego 
scales should be negatively correlated with ACsoc and ACbio measures.  However, studies 
have regularly reported positive correlations between all AC subscales (Joireman et al., 2001; 
Snelgar, 2006; Stern et al., 1993).  The exception is Hansla et al. (2008) who found that 
administering a questionnaire including only negatively framed AC items produced a pattern 
consistent with the ACego scale being negatively correlated with the other two subscales.  Of 
greater concern to the construct validity of the AC scale is the finding that the ACego scale 
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fails to correlate positively with Schwartz’s self enhancement scale (Stern et al., 1995b) or 
the EC egoistic scale (Snelgar, 2006). 
There have also been contradictory claims concerning the dimensionality of the AC 
scale.  Snelgar (2006) has criticised studies (Stern et al., 1993; Stern et al., 1995b) employing 
a theta scaling procedure because this avoids dimensionality tests.  There is no agreement as 
to how many dimensions the AC scale measures, although the original goal was to assess 
beliefs relating to the three value orientations.  Another major problem has been the high 
correlation between subscales.  Subscales are reported to share the same variance as follows: 
18.50% – 36.00% for Stern et al. (1993), 29.16% – 38.44% for Joireman et al. (2001) and 
8.24% – 14.98% for Snelgar (2006).  While Stern et al. (1993) foresaw the potential for 
significant correlations between the three AC beliefs, the amount of shared variance is 
worrisome.  Stern et al (1993) take the high correlation between the subscales as an indication 
that “value orientations may be part of a single perceptual package” (p.340).  This conclusion 
has been supported by studies where principal component analysis (PCA) yielded a one 
factor solution (Stern et al., 1995a; Stern et al., 1995b).  The authors concluded that, rather 
than being a measure of the three value orientations, the AC scale measures a single 
construct, the aforementioned GAC.  Spash (2006), however, found a three factor solution 
with the first loading most on egoistic and social items, the second on social and biospheric, 
and the third combining all three value orientations.  Snelgar (2006) found from two to five 
factors could be extracted using principal axis factoring both with varimax and direct oblimin 
rotations, and also PCA.  She concluded: “no clear structure was obtained with any of these 
analyses.  Thus it is not appropriate to attempt to label any of the factors/components” (p.91). 
Doubts that the scales accurately measure three distinctive elements has led to calls 
for improvement by varying the number of items (Stern et al., 1993) or administering 
negative items only (Hansla et al., 2008).  However, Snelgar (2006), who presents a thorough 
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investigation of the measurement properties of the AC questionnaire, provides the most 
pessimistic prognosis.  Her conclusion is that the EC scale is a better instrument and should 
be used in preference to the AC scale.  However, another possibility is that the AC items are 
being cognitively categorised using a criteria fundamentally different to the value orientation 
system hypothesised by VBN authors. 
 
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS 
A range of researchers have so far expressed concern about the state of the AC questionnaire.  
If the questionnaire is found to elicit a response pattern that is incompatible with the VBN, 
this may prove to be a valuable insight into how people cognitively organise environmental 
beliefs.  Noting that respondents fail to adopt the desired response pattern leaves two 
investigative strategies.  One approach is to scrap the scale, start afresh and aim to measure 
the theoretical model employing a lot more new items and/or a different response scale.  The 
other approach requires investigating why the scale proves a poor measure of the proposed 
model (Schwarz, 2007b).  This would include looking for unexpected questionnaire response 
patterns which explain how people are constructing their environmental attitudes and beliefs.  
A response pattern that is consistently found—even when questionnaire context, participant 
demographics and response scale are varied—would indicate an alternative interpretation of 
the scale is required. 
Previous studies provide some clues for alternative cognitive processes that could 
account for AC scale responses.  Spash (2006) found a factor combining equal loadings 
across all three value orientations.  This was interpreted as “…an anti-environmental 
sentiment or lack of worry over possible environmental problems and a concern about the 
potential negative personal consequences of environmental protection” (Spash, 2006, p.611).  
The implication drawn being that negative egoistic attitudes failed to form part of the egoistic 
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scale and seemed to separate out.  Hansla et al. (2008) found that AC subscale correlations 
demonstrated a different pattern when using only the items phrased in terms of negative 
outcomes.  These results suggest respondents may sort negative environmental consequences 
into a distinctive perceptual category and positive consequences into a separate category.  In 
addition, Snelgar (2006: 88) has commented that: 
“As Stern et al. (1993, 1995) framed the value–belief–norm theory, beliefs that the 
consequences are adverse will result in action.  The beliefs part of the theory can also 
be considered in terms of perceived costs and benefits for valued objects.  
Behavioural intention will be influenced by the perceived costs and benefits of a 
particular environmental action for each set of valued objects, weighted according to 
the individual’s relative value orientations.” 
The PCA matrix reported by Snelgar (2006) also suggests that people might differentiate 
between the positive and negative consequences of not taking environmental action. 
Indeed, there is strong empirical evidence that people are very sensitive as to whether 
statements are framed as positively or negatively.  The theory of planned behaviour, which is 
a consequentialist theory, suggests that people naturally ascribe a positive or negative value 
to their attitudes (Ajzen, 1991). Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) argues that 
individuals construct a reference point and then treat gains differently from losses.  This is 
supported by the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990, 1991) and the 
economic literature contrasting willingness to pay for environmental improvements with 
willingness to accept compensation for environmental damages (Knetsch, 1994, 2005).  A 
plethora of framing studies, such as Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) Asian disease problem, 
suggest that choices can depend on whether the task is perceive in terms of gains or losses.  
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1987, 2000) also suggests that people differentiate 
between the pursuit of gains and the avoidance of losses, and employ distinctive strategies to 
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deal with each of these situations.  Framing in terms of gains evokes a “promotion-focus” that 
leads to growth related strategies that strive to obtain an ideal goal.  Framing in terms of 
losses can form a “prevention-focus”, resulting in strategies to increase personal security in 
“what ought to be”.  Thus, a set of statements mentioning positive or negative consequences 
for the environment may evoke the distinction between individuals promotion or prevention 
stance (Semin, Higgins, Gil de Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 2005), rather than the 
categories suggested by the VBN model. 
Another possible criterion that respondents might employ to categorise AC 
questionnaire items is whether the items mention environmental protection, which implies the 
environment is being proactively safeguarded by human action.  Some AC items imply 
environmental action (e.g., “Environmental protection is beneficial to my health”), while 
others do not (e.g., “The effects of pollution on public health are worse than we realise”; 
“Claims that we are changing the climate are exaggerated”).  Anderson (2003) argues the 
psychological literature has often ignored fundamental differences between action and 
inaction, and that, other things being equal, people generally prefer no change.  He refers to 
the principle of “conservation of energy” as an explanation.  For example, the option of 
environmental protection may involve inconvenience and monetary losses that are less salient 
under inaction.  A range of psychological literature finds people prefer to do nothing as 
opposed to performing an action e.g., status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), 
omission bias (Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1992), inaction inertia (Tykocinski, Pittman, & Tuttle, 
1995) and choice deferral (Dhar, 1996). 
In summary, no one has yet provided good evidence that the AC scale is a measure of 
Stern et al.’s hypothesised structure.  The AC scale has been described as providing a one 
factor solution (Stern et al., 1995a; Stern et al., 1995b) or as being a poor scale (Snelgar, 
2006).  Yet, the AC scale may still be able to provide some insight into how people construct 
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their environmental beliefs.  There is strong empirical research suggesting people cognitively 
differentiate between positive and negative outcomes, as well as being sensitive to whether a 
proposal implies action or inaction.  In order to explore whether the AC scale is a measure of 
an alternative cognitive process, the research reported next compares three public samples 
collected in the context of willingness to pay surveys and a convenience sample collected by 
Snelgar (2006).  These datasets vary by the context in which the AC scale was administered, 
as well as sample size, population characteristics, item presentation order and response scale.  
Bryman (1988) notes that linking concepts to measurement can often be a much more 
inductive exercise than implied by the classical social science model.  In this vein, the 
approach of the current paper is both exploratory and inductive, while drawing upon a 
confirmatory analysis. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
In order to analyse the psychometric properties of the AC scale we utilise three data sets 
collected as part of research on the contingent valuation of environmental proposals.  Two of 
these data sets were collected as part of the same study (i.e., Spash Study 1), but were 
differentiated based on whether the AC items were presented sequentially or mixed with 
other questions.  In all three of the contingent valuation samples respondents were (i) 
members of the general public in the UK approached at home by an independent market 
research company; (ii) recruited via a stratified random sampling procedure; and (iii) verbally 
administered the AC questions in a face-to-face interview.  These surveys were designed and 
all related research coordinated by Spash and funded as part of European Community 
projects (see acknowledgments). 
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Table 3 AC scale items in recent studies 
 Administered 
 
Spash 
1 
Spash 
2 
Snelgar 
(2006) 
ACego1: Environmental protection will provide a better world 
for me and my children 
  × 
ACego2:  Environmental protection is beneficial to my health    
ACego3:  Protecting the environment will threaten jobs for 
people like me 
   
ACego4:  Laws to protect the environment limit my choice and 
personal freedoms 
   
ACego5:  A clean environment provides me with better 
opportunities for recreation 
   
ACsoc1:  Environmental protection benefits everyone    
ACsoc2:  Environmental protection will help people have a 
better quality of life 
   
ACsoc3:  We don’t need to worry much about the environment 
because future generations will be better able to deal 
with these problems than we are 
   
ACsoc4:  The effects of pollution on public health are worse 
than we realise 
   
ACsoc5:  Pollution generated here harms people all over the 
earth 
   
ACbio1:  While some local plants and animals may have been 
harmed by environmental degradation, over the whole 
earth there has been little effect  
×   
ACbio2:  Over the next several decades, thousands of species 
will become extinct 
   
ACbio3:  Claims that current levels of pollution are changing 
earth’s climate are exaggerated 
   
ACbio4:  Tropical rain forests are essential to maintaining a 
healthy planet earth 
  × 
ACbio5:  Modern development threatens wildlife × ×  
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These surveys included 13 AC items designed by Stern and colleagues taken from the 
following studies Stern et al. (1993), Guagnano, Dietz and Stern (1994), Stern et al. (1995a, 
b).  In reviewing the literature the number of distinct biospheric items was found to be limited 
to just three and therefore an extra item was designed and added by Spash (Table 3 item 
ACbio4).  Similarly, Snelgar also designed an additional biospheric item (see Table 3 item 
ACbio5).  While the number of items employed seems small for measuring a multi-attribute 
scale, the work on AC scales has often used even fewer items than in the work by Spash and 
Snelgar. 
 
Spash Study 1 (random condition and non-random condition) 
The survey was conducted to assess the maximum amount people would personally be 
willing to pay each quarter on their electricity bill over the next year to restore biodiversity in 
the river Tummel and its surrounding area.  In total 1069 people participated in the study.  
They were residents from several Scottish regions.  The questionnaire contained 50 items 
including the 13 AC items displayed in Table 3.  Participants answered the AC questions 
using a 7 point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). 
Two conditions were administered Spash Study 1.  One group of participants were 
administered the AC items in a sequential non-random order, while the other answered the 
AC items mixed in with other survey questions.  These responses from these two conditions 
were analysed separately because altering the order of questionnaire items can influence 
responses (Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991).  The non-random condition 
consisted of 528 participants and 511 participants answered all the AC items.  For the random 
condition 541 participants were administered the survey of which 531 participants 
successfully answered all the AC items. 
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Spash Study 2 
A survey was constructed to assess the maximum willingness to pay of individuals for 
converting a small area of Cambridgeshire farmland into a wetland ecosystem.  The 
participants were 713 members of the public recruited from across the UK, with a national 
and regional sample split.  The questionnaire contained 45 items.  In total 572 participants 
completed the 14 AC items shown in Table 3.  Participants responded on a 4-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree). 
 
Table 4  Summary of the design and demographics of the four samples 
 Spash Study 1 
Random 
Spash Study 1 
Non-Random 
Spash Study 2 Snelgar Study 
 
Test type  
 
 
 
Verbally 
administered 
 
Verbally 
administered 
 
Verbally 
administered 
 
Pen & paper 
questionnaire 
Sample 
 
 
 
N=531, Scotland N=511, Scotland N=572, UK 
national 
N=101, 
University of 
Westminster 
Context of 
administering 
AC scale 
 
 
WTP survey for 
restoring 
biodiversity  
WTP survey for 
restoring 
biodiversity 
WTP survey for 
converting 
farmland to 
wetland 
Undergraduate 
course activity 
AC items 
sequential or 
randomised 
 
Randomly mixed 
with other survey 
items 
Sequentially 
administered 
Randomly mixed 
with political 
action scale 
Sequentially 
administered  
Response 
Scale  
 
7-point scale 7-point scale 4-point scale 7-point scale 
Age 
 
60.6% ≤ age 44 59.1% ≤  age 44 57.6% ≤ age 44 Not reported 
Gender 
 
53.1% females 48.5% females 59.1% females Not reported 
Education 
 
53.3% left school 
at age 16 
51.5% left school 
at age 16 
52.0% left school 
at age 16 
100% 
undergraduate 
students 
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Table 4 summarises the design of the three samples alongside the design reported by 
Snelgar (2006).  Table 4 highlights the differences in (i) how the scale was administered to 
participants, (ii) study context, (iii) sample size, (iv) response scale, and (v) whether the items 
were presented sequentially or mixed with non-AC questionnaire items.  Table 4 also 
presents demographics (i.e., age, gender and education) for the three samples collected by 
Spash. 
The following criteria will be used to assess whether the AC scale demonstrates the 
pattern proposed by Stern and colleagues: (i) correlations between subscales, (ii) internal 
consistency and (iii) dimensionality.  Any emergent pattern is assessed based on (i) 
interpretability, (ii) correlations between new factors, (iii) internal consistency and (iv) the 
results of a confirmatory factor analysis. 
 
RESULTS 
Correlations between the subscales proposed by VBN authors are shown in Table 5.  Note the 
correlations between (i) egoistic and social subscales, and (ii) egoistic and biospheric 
subscales are positive rather than negative as VBN predicts.  Indeed, all of the correlations 
are large and positive.  The subscales share between 21% and 45% of the same variance, 
which suggests that the constructs are partially measuring the same construct as proposed by 
the GAC interpretation. 
Table 5 Study 1 and 2 Pearson bivariate correlations between AC subscales 
 Egoistic 
& 
Social 
 Egoistic 
& 
Biospheric 
 Social 
& 
Biospheric 
Spash Study 1: Random  0.66**  0.46**  0.63** 
Spash Study 1: Non-random  0.67**  0.57**  0.64** 
Spash Study 2 0.67**  0.57**  0.60** 
** p < 0.001 
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Cronbach’s α reliabilities were calculated.  Table 6 displays Cronbach’s α for the 
theoretical subscales for each of the three samples.  The social subscale reported moderate 
reliability.  The egoistic and biospheric subscales, however, reported poor reliability. 
Table 6  Study 1 and 2 Cronbach’s α for AC subscales 
 Egoistic Scale  Social Scale  Biospheric Scale 
Spash Study 1: Random .60  .70  .44 
Spash Study 1: Non-random .60  .72  .52 
Spash Study 2 .56  .69  .53 
 
Exploratory analysis 
In order to meet various referees comments we decided to conduct an exploratory analysis on 
the datasets collected from the two random and non-random conditions administered in Spash 
Study 1, and then to investigate any emergent patterns on the data collected from Spash Study 
2 with a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  The exploratory analysis employed a principal 
axis factor analysis (FA).  As Stern and colleagues (Stern et al., 1995a; Stern et al., 1995b) 
proposed a single factor GAC solution, which is supported by the correlations in Table 5, a 
direct oblimin rotation was employed because this rotation favours a one factor solution.  
Two principal axis factor analyses with direct oblmin rotations conducted on the two Spash 
Study 1 datasets were compared with the results of Snelgar’s (2006) reported PCA with 
varimax rotation.  Eigenvalue scores being greater than 1 was the criteria employed to select 
how many components to extract from the PCA.  An assessment of scree plots confirmed that 
this approach was suitable.  Table 7 presents the eigenvalues and percentage of variance 
explained for the Spash Study 1 FA.  The non-random study reported a three component 
solution, while the random study was found to be best described by a two factor solution, 
although the percentage of variance explained in each study was low. 
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Table 7 Eigenvalues and percentage of variance explained 
 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Total 
% of 
Variance
Cumulative
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Study 1 Non-random       
Factor 1 5.14 39.57 39.57 4.70 36.18 36.18 
Factor 2 1.51 11.64 51.21 .83 6.40 42.57 
Factor 3 1.16 8.90 60.11 .65 5.00 47.57 
Study 1 Random       
Factor 1 4.89 37.62 37.62 4.37 33.60 33.60 
Factor 2 1.50 11.53 49.15 .78 5.98 39.58 
 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is an index for 
comparing the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitude of partial 
correlation coefficients.  The results were 0.88 for non-random condition and 0.89 for the 
random condition.  These high KMO indexes provide evidence that the AC items can be 
grouped into a smaller set of underlying factors.  This contradicts Snelgar’s (2006) 
conclusion that the AC scale has no clear factor structure. 
In Table 8 the rotated component matrix from Snelgar’s (2006) study and two rotated 
factor matrices from Spash Study 1 are presented alongside each other.  All three rotated 
matrices clearly fail to illustrate the theoretical structure proposed by VBN authors.  For 
example, in all four samples, Factor 1 contains a mixture of egoistic, social and biospheric 
items.  However, the combined rotated component matrix for the four studies does present a 
consistent loading pattern, but that is not a one factor solution. 
An inspection of Table 8 reveals two clusters of items that load on separate factors for 
all of the samples.  There is also some evidence that these two factors can be further divided 
into a four factor solution.  Studying Table 8 reveals that the items ACego3, ACego4, 
ACsoc3, ACbio1 and ACbio3 consistently load on a different factor to the rest of the items.  
We interpret these items as representing “beliefs that are supportive of environmental 
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inaction”.  All the other items represent “beliefs that are supportive of environmental action”.  
Furthermore, the non-random condition reported a three factor solution, with some of the 
items referring to “beliefs supportive of environmental action” appearing on Factor 3.  We 
interpret this third factor to represent “beliefs that environmental protection has positive 
consequences” and “beliefs that the environment is being seriously harmed”.  In the Snelgar 
sample the “beliefs that are supportive of environmental inaction” also separated into two 
components.  We interpret these factors as representing “beliefs that environmental protection 
has negative consequences” and “beliefs that the environment is not being seriously harmed”.  
Therefore, although Table 7 shows only 2 factor and 3 factor solutions, we believe that there 
is evidence that responses to the AC scale are influenced by whether a statement implies 
action or inaction.  There is also some indication that items that focus on the consequences of 
environmental action can be differentiated from beliefs about whether or not the environment 
is being harmed. 
Table 8 Rotated matrix for Spash and Snelgar studies 
 Spash Study 1 
FA with Quartimax rotation 
 Snelgar 
PA with Varimax rotation 
 Study 1 
Non-Random 
 Study 1 
Random 
 Study 2006 
 1 2 3  1 2  1 2 3 
ACego1 .87   .78      
ACego2 .76   .67   .76   
ACego5 .71   .75   .33   
ACsoc1 .68   .70   .55  .38 
ACsoc2 .78   .77   .61 .41  
ACbio4 .75   .64      
ACego3  .52   .47    .74 
ACego4  .54   .57    .75 
ACsoc3  .46  -.36 .36   .74  
ACbio1         .72  
ACbio3  .35      .72  
ACsoc4 .49  .45 .55    .48  
ACsoc5 .59  .51 .63   .65   
ACbio2 .46  .45 .53   .59   
ACbio5       .48   
Note: Factor loadings less than .30 are not reported 
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Table 9 presents the items for each of the four proposed clusters.  The “beliefs that 
environmental protection has positive consequences” and the “beliefs that the environment is 
being seriously harmed” can be combined into a “beliefs supportive of environmental action” 
(BSEA) scale, while the “beliefs that environmental protection has negative consequences” 
and “beliefs that the environment is not being seriously harmed” can be combined into a 
“beliefs supportive of environmental inaction” (BSEI) scale.  We note here that there are 
three items which failed to load strongly onto our new interpretation.  These are items 
ACbio3, ACsoc4 and ACbio5, which have either low or inconsistent factor loadings and 
would be candidate items to be dropped from future work trying to develop the proposed 
scales. 
Table 9  The items for the four clusters 
Grouping 1a – Beliefs that environmental protection has positive consequences 
ACego1: Environmental protection will provide a better world for me and my children 
ACego2: Environmental protection is beneficial to my health 
ACego5: A clean environment provides me with better opportunities for recreation 
ACsoc1:  Environmental protection benefits everyone 
ACsoc2:  Environmental protection will help people have a better quality of life 
ACbio4:  Tropical rain forests are essential to maintain a healthy planet earth 
Grouping 1b – Beliefs that the environment is being seriously harmed 
*ACsoc4:  The effects of pollution on public health are worse than we realise. 
ACsoc5:  Pollution generated here harms people all over the earth 
ACbio2:  Over the next several decades, thousands of species will become extinct 
*ACbio5:  Modern development threatens wildlife 
Grouping 2a – Beliefs that environmental protection has negative consequences 
ACego3:  Protecting the environment will threaten jobs for people like me 
ACego4:  Laws to protect the environment limit my choice and personal freedoms 
Grouping 2b – Beliefs that the environment is not being seriously harmed 
ACsoc3:  We don’t need to worry much about the environment because future generations 
will be better able to deal with these problems than we are 
ACbio1:  While some local plants and animals may have been harmed by environmental 
degradation, over the whole earth there has been little effect 
*ACbio3:  Claims that current levels of pollution are changing earth’s climate are 
Exaggerated 
* Item that did not consistently load strongly onto factor 
 
Table 10 displays Cronbach’s α for the newly proposed subscales.  The 
“environmental protection has positive consequences” scale, despite being a combination of 
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egoistic, social and biospheric items, demonstrates an excellent reliability coefficient.  The 
BSEI items report poor reliabilities similar to the reliabilities for the egoistic and biospheric 
subscales (see Table 6). 
 
Table 10 Cronbach’s α for newly proposed subscales 
  Spash Studies 
 
Scale 
 Study 1: 
Non - Random 
 Study 1: 
Random 
BSEA scale   .88 
(9 items) 
 .88 
(9 items) 
Environmental protection has 
positive consequences 
 .89 
(6 items) 
 .87 
(6 items) 
The environment is being seriously 
harmed 
 .73 
(3 items) 
 .68 
(3 items) 
BSEI scale   .56 
(4 items) 
 .50 
(4 items) 
Environmental protection has 
negative consequences 
 .45 
(2 items) 
 .44 
(2 items) 
The environment is not being 
seriously harmed scale 
 .40 
(2 items) 
 .35 
(2 items) 
 
Table 11 displays the bivariate correlations for the newly proposed subscales.  In both 
samples the “environmental protection has positive consequences” scale and the 
“environment is being seriously harmed” scale report large positive correlations, which is 
consistent with the argument that they form part of the higher order BSEA factor.  The 
“environment is not being seriously harmed” scale and the environmental protection has 
negative consequences” scale also demonstrate large positive correlations, which is consistent 
with their combination into the higher order BSEI factor.  The “environmental protection has 
positive consequence” scale correlate negatively with both the “environmental protection has 
negative consequences” scale and the “environment is not being seriously harmed” scale.  
The “environmental protection has negative consequences” scale is negatively correlated with 
the “environmental protection has positive consequences” scale, while only having an 
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insignificant relationship with the “environment is being seriously harmed” scale.  All of 
these correlations are theoretically consistent.  While Table 10 displays some large 
correlations, there does seem to be a significant improvement over the AC subscale 
correlations (between 0.67 and 0.46) as presented in Table 5.  The correlations between 
BSEA items and BSEI items are much smaller than the correlations between any of the AC 
subscales. 
Table 11  Bivariate correlations for the newly proposed subscales 
 Spash Studies 
 Study 1: 
Non-Random 
 Study 1: 
Random 
BSEA scale & BSEI scale  -.33**  -.30** 
Environmental protection has positive consequences & 
Environment is being seriously harmed 
.58**  .61** 
Environmental protection has positive consequences & 
Environmental protection has negative consequences 
-.17**  -.14** 
Environmental protection has positive consequences & 
Environment is not being seriously harmed 
-.35**  -.38** 
Environment is being seriously harmed & Environmental 
protection has negative consequences 
-.06  .02 
Environment is being seriously harmed & Environment is 
not being seriously harmed 
-.34**  -.30** 
Environment is not being seriously harmed & 
Environmental protection has negative consequences 
-.36**  -.29** 
** p < .001  * p < .005 
 
Confirmatory analysis 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted on the Spash Study 2 sample to 
compare the alternative interpretation presented in the exploratory analysis section with Stern 
and colleagues valuation orientation and GAC interpretations.  A major strength of a CFA 
analysis is that it is able to account for the possibility that two scales (e.g. “environmental 
protection has positive consequences” and the “environment is being harmed”) can be 
combined at a higher level (e.g. BSEA scale).  Such a hierarchical relationship may be able to 
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explain a significantly higher proportion of the variance of the scale than the Principal Axis 
FA conducted on the AC scale. 
The CFA compares Stern’s GAC interpretation (model 1), Stern’s value orientation 
interpretation (model 2), the proposed two factor beliefs supportive of environmental 
action/inaction interpretation (model 3), outlined in the previous section, and the hierarchical 
interpretation outlined in Table 9.  Structural analysis was conducting in Amos 17.0 using the 
maximum likelihood method.  Criteria usually thought to indicate an acceptable fit are: ≤ 3 
for χ2/df, RMSEA ≤ .6 and the other fit indices (NFI, TLI, GFI, AGFI) ≥ .95 (Schreiber, 
Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006).  The CFA conducted on the generally accepted EC 
scales, however, have reported CFA results where χ2/df  ≤ 4 for, RMSEA ≤ .9 and the other 
fit indices (NFI, TLI, GFI, AGFI) ≥ .90 (see Milfont et al., 2006; Schultz, 2000, 2001; 
Snelgar, 2006).  Nested models can also be compared with the χ2diff test.  Models which are 
not nested can be compare with the AIC and BIC statistics, where smaller AIC and BIC 
statistics represent a better model. 
When analysing the SEM for the hierarchical model proposed in Table 9, the 2nd order 
factor “environment is being seriously harmed” was found to report a variance greater than 1 
and one of the items on this 2nd order factor also reported a standardised coefficient greater 
than 1.  This suggests that the BSEI scale should not be further divided into 2nd order-factors.  
The hierarchal model (model 4) is therefore presented as having 2nd order factors for the 
BSEA scale, but not for BSEI scale (see Figure 5). 
Table 12 displays the χ2 and fit indices outcomes for each model.  Figure 2 illustrates 
the estimated standardised regression weights and the variance of each observed variable for 
model 1.  Figure 3 depicts model 2, with this model also displaying correlations between the 
egoistic, social and biospheric scales.  While model 2 was found to report a significantly 
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better fit than model 1 [χ2diff (3) = 24.8, p < .001], Table 12 demonstrates that both models 
report similarly poor fit indices.   
When compared to model 1, both model 3 [χ2diff (1) = 193.9, p < .001] and model 4 
[χ2diff (3) = 278.4, p < .001] were found to report much better fits.  As model 2 did not have a 
nested relationship with model 3 or model 4, the AIC and BIC statistic were used to compare 
these models.  Table 12 shows that model 3 (see Figure 4) and model 4 (see Figure 5) both 
reported a lower AIC and BIC statistic than model 2, which indicates these models provided a 
better fit.  Furthermore, model 4 was found to be a significant improvement over the two 
factored model 3 [χ2diff (2) = 84.5, p < .001].  In fact the fit indices for model 4 were found to 
be as good if not better than the fit indices reported in any of the studies that reported a CFA 
for the EC scale  (Milfont et al., 2006; Schultz, 2000, 2001; Snelgar, 2006). 
 
Table 12 CFA Measures of fit for four proposed theoretical models 
 χ2 Df χ2/df RMSEA NFI TLI GFI AGFI AIC BIC
Model 1 
One-factor GAC 481* 77 6.24 .10 .78 .78 .87 .83 537 658 
Model 2 
Stern three factors 456* 74 6.16 .10 .79 .78 .88 .83 518 653 
Model 3 
Revised two factor 287* 76 3.77 .07 .87 .88 .93 .90 345 471 
Model 4 
Revised hierarchical 202* 74 2.73 .06 .91 .93 .95 .93 264 399 
Notes:  RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; NFI = normed fit index; TLI = 
Tucker-Lewis coefficient; GFI = goodness of fit index; AGFI = adjusted goodness of fit 
index; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayes information criterion. 
p < .0001 
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General Awareness
of Consequences
.63ACego1
.37ACego2
.34ACego5
.30ACsoc1
.59ACsoc2
.28ACsoc5
.05ACego3
.03ACego4
.42ACbio4
.16ACbio2
.19ACsoc3
.55
.77
.53
-.44
.64
.58
-.18
.80
.13ACbio1-.36
.09ACbio3
.40
-.30
-.22
.61
.35ACsoc4
.59
 
Figure 2. Model 1: The General Awareness of Consequences one factor model (Standardised 
estimates) 
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Social
.62ACego1
.37ACego2
.33ACego5
.29ACsoc1
.58ACsoc2
.25ACsoc5
.04ACego3
.03ACego4
.51ACbio4
.19ACbio2
Biospheric
Egoistic
.20ACsoc3
.76
.79
.91
1.07
.17ACbio1
.11ACbio3
.32ACsoc4
.87
.54
-.21
-.18
.57
-.44
.57
.50
-.41
.44
.71
-.34
.61
 
 
Figure 3. Model 2: The 3 factor Egoistic, Social and Biospheric model (Standardised 
estimates) 
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.65ACego1
.38ACego2
.34ACego5
.31ACsoc1
.61ACsoc2
.28ACsoc5
.21ACego3
.23ACego4
.40ACbio4
.15ACbio2
.45ACsoc3
Beliefs Supportive of
Environmental Action
Beliefs Supportive of
Environmental Inaction
-.51
.36ACbio1
.16ACbio3
.35ACsoc4
.80
.62
.58
.56
.78
.59
.53
.39
.63
.46
.48
.67
.60
.40
 
Figure 4: Model 3: The revised two factor model (Standardised estimates) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Model 4: The revised 2 stage hierarchical model (Standardised estimates) 
.79
Beliefs that environmental
protection has positive 
consequences 
.68ACego1 
.38ACego2
.34ACego5 
.30ACsoc1
.64ACsoc2
.49ACsoc5
.21ACego3
.23ACego4
.39ACbio4
.29ACbio2
.66
Beliefs that the environment
is being seriously harmed
.45ACsoc3
Beliefs Supportive of 
Environmental Action
Beliefs supportive of 
Environmental Inaction
.15ACbio3
.36ACbio1
.47ACsoc4
.81
-.56 
.89 
.68 
.70
.54
.82 
.62 
.58
.55
.80 
.62 
.46
.48
.67
.60 
.39 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Environmental psychologists investigate human behaviour and how it might be changed to 
avoid environmental degradation.  These constructs when placed into behaviour models can 
feed into a policy process and influence regulatory design.  Behavioural models are often 
general in nature and can be applied to a variety of topics such as political action, recycling 
and household water management.  The potential for direct policy relevance relates to 
correctly understanding the key motive and barriers to human action and for some 
behavioural models this requires outlining an empirically verifiable relationship between 
“held values” and other environmental cognitions. 
Stern et al. designed the AC scale in order to test the proposition that people 
cognitively differentiate between egoistic, social and biospheric concerns when assessing 
beliefs about adverse general environmental consequences.  The VBN model has made a 
significant contribution to the environmental attitude-behaviour literature.  However, the 
results of the current study indicate that VBN value orientations are not influential in 
organising general beliefs about environmental consequences.  AC items, which are 
representative of media statements and everyday comments, and therefore are of general 
public interest, do not seem to be cognitively organised according to the assumptions of the 
VBN model. 
A questionnaire design that encourages participants to assess their beliefs on emotive 
and subjective criteria, such as the EC scale, would seem to be required in order to develop a 
scale that measures such constructs.  If this is so, a scale trying to measure VBN value 
orientations based on general statements of awareness of consequences could not be 
improved by simply adding more items or designing ‘better’ items in the same mode.  A 
more emotive approach would be required to increase the salience of an individual’s value 
orientation on the construction of the belief, such as asking participants to assess their 
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concerns about valued objects.  In addition, value orientations may directly influence other 
emotional cognitions such as environmental norms and expectations. 
A revised model is proposed in Figure 6, which is consistent with empirical findings 
for the current study and Snelgar.  Based on the findings of both an exploratory and 
confirmatory FA, “beliefs supportive of environmental action” appear to be influenced by 
egoistic, social or biospheric concerns about environmental problems.  Furthermore they can 
be separated into “beliefs about the environment being seriously harmed” and “beliefs about 
environmental protection having positive consequences”.  While the current study, unlike 
Snelgar's, did not find that “beliefs supportive of environmental inaction” can be similarly 
separated into two components, we suggest this relationship should be further explored. 
A possible relationship is that biospheric concerns about environmental problems are 
negatively correlated with “beliefs that the environment is not being seriously harmed” (or 
“beliefs supportive of environmental inaction”, if no second order factor is found).  Social 
and egoistic concerns about the costs of conservation should be positively correlated with 
“beliefs that environmental action has negative consequences” (or “beliefs supportive of 
environmental inaction”, if no second order factor is found).  In future work there needs to be 
some account taken of the relationships between environmental concern and environmental 
beliefs. 
Our exploratory and confirmatory FA presents evidence that people have a tendency 
to differentiate between environmental action and inaction.  There is also some evidence that 
respondents differentiated between the environment being harmed and the benefits of 
environmental protection.  An improved BSEI scale should be developed.  The relative 
weakness of this scale is unsurprising given that it arises from items designed for a different 
purpose (i.e. to measure AC beliefs).  The BSEI scale could therefore be improved by 
dropping some items (e.g. ACbio3 and ACsoc4), adapting others, and adding new items.  
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This process would also benefit from working with a far greater number of items than has 
been typical in research on the AC scale.  We note that the confirmatory analysis conducted 
on hierarchical model 4, which is made up of items which could be refined, reported fit 
indices on par, if not better than the indices reported for the EC scale. 
These findings also shed light on some of the measurement anomalies in the AC scale 
literature.  Where subscale reliabilities have proven satisfactory this may be due to a high 
proportion of environmental action items.  Thus, the AC social subscale has four out of five 
of its items classified into the BSEA factor and was found to have higher reliabilities than the 
other subscales.  The fact that different concepts are being measured than those assumed by 
VBN theory also explains why the AC egoistic subscale has previously been found to be 
insignificantly correlated with the EC egoistic subscale and Schwartz’s self enhancement 
scale.  This is also an alternative explanation, to the one factor GAC interpretation, for the 
high correlations between the egoistic, social and biospheric AC subscales. 
The results presented here indicate that the scales being employed to measure 
egoistic, altruistic and biospheric value orientations actually relate to beliefs about whether 
environmental action or inaction is required.  “Beliefs Supportive of environmental action” 
can be further classified into “beliefs about environmental harm being serious” and “beliefs 
that environmental action has positive consequences”.  Improving a reinterpreted scale as a 
measure of these concepts seems worthwhile.  This suggests a new relationship between 
environmental concerns and beliefs.  A more sophisticated understanding of this relationship 
could aid environmental policy by supplying a new means of identifying motives behind and 
barriers to behavioural change. 
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